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This article still takes the stance that there is an alternative way to reconstruct 
the Muslim conquest of the Roman Levant, which is actually militarily more plausible 
than the current consensus view among the historians. The following account proves 
that the ability of the Muslims to conquer Jerusalem in about 635-637 was based on 
two things: 1) the military blunders committed by the Romans; 2) the superb strategic 
and tactical skills of the Muslim leadership. The analysis will show that it was 
the Muslim military might and the way in which it was used that decided the fate 
of the city of Jerusalem. In the last resort, the ownership of the city depended and will 
in all probability always depend on the individual decisions taken by generals, officers 
and soldiers.  
The evidence for the early stages of the Muslim conquest of Roman territory is 
controversial because the sources offer conflicting and confused evidence.  
The consensus view among modern historians is that the Muslim conquest began 
in earnest with the battle of Ajdanayn in 634 after which they conquered Damascus 
and that the Romans then launched a counter attack which failed at the battle 
of Yarmuk in the summer of 636 after which followed up the Muslim conquests 
of Syria, Palestine and Jerusalem. This study, however, takes up a different view 
and suggests that the battle of Ajdanayn has been confused with the battle of Yarmuk 
in the Arabic sources and that the actual battle of Ajdanayn took place only after 
the battle of Yarmuk. This study also suggests that some of the East Roman sources 
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have confused the battle of Gabitha/al-Jahiya with the battle of Yarmuk
1
. The view 
adopted here on the basis of military probability is that, with some emendations,  
which take into account the doublets, Tabari’s account (mainly the one base on Sayf) 
has preserved for us the genuine sequence of events
2
. The following account begins 
with the major campaign that Abu Bakr launched to conquer the Roman Syria 
and Palestine in 634. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Map of the Principat Locations Mentioned in the Text. © SYVÄNNE 2018 
                                                          
1 The confusion is evident in Theophanes AM 6125. 
2 Ṭabarī 2079-2127, 2346-2350. The battle of Ajdanayn (i.2124-2127) is a doublet of Yarmuk while 
the 2398-2402 represents the genuine event.  
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The Beginning of the Major Offensive against the Romans in 634 
 
According to Ṭabarī, Abu Bakr began his main campaign against Roman 
Palestine and Syria in March 634. He planned to conquer the area with a multipronged 
invasion. Amr b. al-Asi was dispatched to Aqabah with the goal of advancing into 
Palestine. Yazid b Abi Sufyan, Abu Ubaydah b. al-Jarrab and Shurahbil b. Hasanah 
were dispatched to the plateau east of river Jordan with the purpose of invading Syria. 
Khalid b. Said was dispatched to Tayma. When the Romans leant of the concentration 
of forces, they levied forces of Arabic origin from Syria against them. Abu Bakr 
ordered Khalid to attack. The Arabs duly deserted to Khalid’s side and embraced 
Islam. It is very likely that this resulted from the Roman refusal to pay the traditional 
payments to their Arabic allies. The adoption of this policy was very unwise indeed. 
After the above desertion, the patrikios/patricius Bahan/Vahan marched against 
Khalid, but was defeated. Khalid, however, appears to have suffered significant 
number of casualties because he then asked Abu Bakr to dispatch reinforcements. 
Since all of Khalid’s men wanted to be replaced, Abu Bakr did that by dispatching 
al-Walid with orders to conquer the area around Tiberias. At the same time as 
this happened Abu Bakr dispatched reinforcements to Amr who was ordered 
to conquer Palestine. Khalid used the replacement army for an immediate offensive. 
Vahan feigned flight and retreated towards Damascus and then ambushed Khalid 
at Marj al-Suffar. Vahan’s wings surrounded the Arabs at the same time as he turned 
against them. Khalid’s son Said b. Khalid was killed, and when the news was brought 
to Khalid, he fled. Ikrimah, however, fought an effective rearguard action and was able 
to put a stop to the pursuit. Khalid b. Said was duly relieved of his command
3
.  
After this, Abu Bakr ordered the four other generals to begin their invasion 
so that each of them was given chief cities of Syria as objectives while Ikrimah with 
the remaining forces of Khalid was to serve as a covering force for them. Amr and Abu 
Ubaydah marched along the coastal route. Yazid and Shurahbil marched along 
the Tabuk road. When the emperor Heraclius was informed of this, he marched 
to Emesa (Hims/Homs) where he prepared the soldiers for combat with drills 
and exercises. Tabari claims that Heraclius dispatched his full brother Theodore with 
90,000 (9,000?) men against Amr. Theodore’s force was also supported by a “rear 
guard” which marched along up to Thaniyyat Jilliq (village of Jillin in southern 
Hawran in Syria)
4
 where it encamped. Did this ‘rear guard’ oppose Ikrimah? Jurjah 
b. Tawdhura (George son of Theodore) was sent against Yazid and they encamped 
                                                          
3 Ṭabarī 2078-2086; Theophanes AM 6123 (AD 630-631). The dating in Theophanes is several years off. 
Theophanes (AM 6124/ AD 631/2) includes also a minor incident not mentioned by Tabari. According to 
Theophanes, in the year when Abu Bakr dispatched four generals against the Romans (i.e. in 634), Sergius 
marched from Caesarea with 300 soldiers against the Arabs who had advanced to Gaza with the result that 
he and his men were killed. 
4 Identification of the locale by Blankinship/Ṭabarī, 84. 
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opposite each other. Al-Duraqis (possibly Theodore the sakellarios/Theodore 
Trithyrios) opposed Shurahbil, and al-Fiqar b. Nastus (bikarios/vicarius son of Nastus) 
with 60,000 (6,000?) men opposing Abu Ubaydah. The Muslims were frightened 
because the Romans outnumbered them. According to the first version preserved 
by Ṭabarī, the four generals had 21,000 and Ikrimah 6,000 men, but at a later point 
Ṭabarī includes the claim that the four generals had 27,000 men plus 3,000 survivors 
of Khalid b. Said and 6,000 men of Ikrimah for a grand total of 36,000 men. However, 
if the size of the Roman force was about 40,000 men
5
, which is likely, the numerical 
difference was not great, but still significant enough to cause worry so that Abu Bakr 
ordered them to unite their forces
6
. When Heraclius learnt of this, he ordered his 
patrikioi to unite their forces. Theodore was to be the overall commander, George in 
command of the vanguard, Vahan and al-Duraqis were in charge of the wings 
and vicarius in charge of mobilization
7
 (harb, in this case probably meaning logistics 
and/or the camp with infantry), but this actually describes the situation after the arrival 
of Vahan with reinforcements. He also sent them orders to choose such a battleground 
in which the place was easy to supply. The location was also to have a wide space 
for the pursuit of the enemy, but with very little room for retreat. The Strategikon 
recommended this kind of battlefield when the commander feared the prospect 
of attack against his rear because the enemy possessed very sizable cavalry forces 
or outnumbered the Roman cavalry
8
.  
However, I would suggest that in this case we should interpret this instruction 
in another way because the Muslims had fewer horsemen than the Romans.  
In my opinion, the selection of a battlefield which prevented an easy flight proves that 
the morale in the Roman army was not high. Heraclius’ intention was to force the men 
to fight because the army was placed in such a locale that prevented an easy flight.  
The four likeliest reasons for the poor morale would be the religious disputes within 
the Church, the persecution of the religious minorities, the failing mental and physical 
health of the emperor, and especially the endemic difficulties in paying the salaries 
of the soldiers
9
. The important point here is that it was the Roman side which chose 
the battlefield and not the Muslims as usually claimed. The Roman leadership 
beginning with the emperor was clearly not up to the task.  
                                                          
5 On the basis of Theophanes (AM 6125-6) it is easy to see that before the reinforcements brought 
by Vahan and Theodore the sakellarios the Romans had about 40,000 men.  
6 Ṭabarī 2085-2088, 2090-2091. It is possible to think that in the larger version Ikrimah’s 6,000 men 
and the 3,000 survivors of Khalid b. Said have been counted twice, once among the 27,000 men and then 
again as separate forces, but I have here accepted the larger version because it explains better why 
the Romans chose not to attack. 
7 This is Blankinships’ translation in Ṭabarī, 85. 
8 Ṭabarī 2088-2089; Strategikon, 11.2.99ff., 12.2.23.1-7. See also the perceptive comments of KAEGI 
(1992: 123-125). 
9 The problems facing Heraclius before the main Muslim attack are analyzed by KAEGI (2003: 192-228). 
It is obvious that many of these affected the morale. The most important of these is likely to have been 
the difficulty of paying salaries which is mentioned by Theophanes (AM 6123). 
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The poor morale was not the only problem facing the Romans. None of 
the extant sources give any details that would suggest that the Roman infantry would 
have fought successfully after 599. The extant texts prove that Heraclius achieved all 
of his victories in pitched battles against the Persians with his cavalry, which means 
that Heraclius had used his infantry only for the holding of the camp, protection 
of the rear of the cavalry forces and for sieges after the year 622. There could be two 
reasons for this. Heraclius was either prejudiced against infantry forces just like 
Belisarius had been, or the Roman infantry was not really combat ready and Heraclius 
knew this. Either way, this was disastrous for the Romans who now faced an enemy 
which relied on the combined arms concept to win the battles
10
. If the emperor did not 
trust his infantry to be able to face the Muslims, he should not have used it all, but he 
should have relied on the cavalry to defeat the enemy. And how the cavalry should 
have been used when it faced an enemy force which employed the combined arms 
concept? Its superior numbers should have been used for mobile guerrilla warfare 
with the goal of denying access to food and water, but this was not to be because 
the Romans sought a decisive battle. 
 
The Battle of Jabiya-Yarmuk in 634 
 
When the Romans had then pitched their marching camp close to 
al-Waqusah/Yaqusa, they used the wadi behind them as a trench and built a fortified 
marching camp to the east of it. The location of the camp is not known and has been 
variously placed by historians. This is a question that only battlefield archaeology 
can solve. All that we know for certain is that the Romans had both the Wadi Ruqqah 
(the rear of the camp) and al-Waqusah behind them. The likeliest location is probably 
just in front of the bridge leading across the Wadi Ruqqah. See the map. The Muslims 
in their turn united their forces and marched to the scene where they built a camp 
opposite the Romans. Amr was particularly elated because the Romans had placed 
themselves in a trap. This resulted in stalemate which lasted from April 6 until July 2, 
634/6. Initially, the Romans were unable to even leave their camp, but after June 3 they 
managed to force the Muslims to such a distance that they could start a period 
of prolonged skirmishing which lasted until July 2. Both sides felt unable to commit 
their army to a full battle with the result that both asked reinforcements from their 
rulers. Heraclius dispatched Vahan and Theodore the sakellarios with reinforcements 
to the scene
11
 while Abu Bakr most famously sent Khalid b. Walid from Iraq to 
the rescue presumably with orders to take the overall command. Ṭabarī’s text claims 
                                                          
10 SYVÄNNE 2004: 451-456, 478-489. 
11 It is probable that the sending of reinforcements to the Romans at the request of Theodore, the brother 
of Heraclius, has been confused in Theophanes (AM 6126) who claims that it was Vahan who urged 
the sakellarios to bring reinforcements. It is more than likely that these two men brought reinforcements to 
the scene together.  
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that the Romans had after this 80,000 cavalry and 80,000 infantry, but on the basis 
of the Roman sources the likelier figures are 40,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry, which 
was still a major effort. The Roman army, however, was very imbalanced as a fighting 
force and the inability of the infantry and cavalry to cooperate made the situation even 
worse. Vahan had dispatched deacons, monks, and priests ahead of time to encourage 
the men to fight. This suggests a very poor morale because the men clearly needed 
extra effort from the religious establishment to fight
12
.  
According to another version of the battle preserved in Ṭabarī, the Roman 
army present at the battle of Yarmuk consisted of the regulars, allied Arabs (Lakhm, 
Judham, Balqayn, Bali, Amila and tribes affiliated with Qudaah and Ghassan)  
and allied Armenians. The overall size of the force was 100,000 men so that it included 
12,000 Armenians under Jarajah and 12,000 Arabs under Jabalah b, al-Ayham 
al-Ghassani. The overall commander was al-Saqalar (sacellarius), the eunuch 
of Heraclius. The figures for the Armenians and Arabs can be considered reliable 
and so can the overall size of 100,000 men if one includes in it the servants
13
.  
The Muslims in their turn had 27,000 men in four divisions and an additional 
3,000 men drawn from the remnants of Khalid b. Said’s forces which were divided 
between Muawiyah and Shurahbil. Ikrimah possessed an additional 6,000 men who 
had acted as a rear guard for Khalid b. Said. Therefore the overall size of the Muslim 
army before the arrival of Khalid b. Walid was 36,000 men
14
. Khalid b. Walid brought 
additional 10,000 men, which were urgently needed in a situation in which the Romans 
were reinforced by 40,000 men. The overall size of the Muslim army was therefore 
46,000 men, most of which consisted of infantry
15
.  
The Romans attacked immediately after Vahan’s reinforcements had arrived. 
The Muslims were in trouble thanks to their numerical disadvantage, but the last 
minute arrival of Khalid with his reinforcements and the fact that he assumed 
the command of the army changed the situation so that the Muslims forced the Romans 
to flee back to their camp. I would suggest that we should connect this with 
the incident mentioned by Ibn Ishaq according to which the Romans managed 
to penetrate into the Muslim camp where even the women fought with swords
16
. 
The Romans stayed inside their camp for a month from July 3 until the month 
of Jumada al-Akhirah (August 2-30). During this period the priests, deacons, and 
monks did their best to uplift the morale until the soldiers were finally ready to attempt 
another attack – the morale was clearly not high. Theophanes dates the battle to have 
                                                          
12 Ṭabarī 2088-2089; Theophanes AM 6125-6126.  
13 Ṭabarī 2347ff. 
14 The four divisions can be equated with the late Roman divisions in which the different infantry 
and cavalry units were combined to create temporary old style legions with ca. 4,000-6,000 infantry 
 (an infantry meros/legio) and 800-1,600 cavalry. For the development of this type of regiment, see 
SYVÄNNE 2015-2017. 
15 Ṭabarī 2090ff. 
16 Ṭabarī 2347. 
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taken place on Tuesday July 23, which would date the battle to the year 636. 
Considering the many problems with Theophanes’ text, I would not put too much trust 
on the date but would rather follow the very detailed account of Ṭabarī in this case. 
This would place the battles of Yarmuk and al-Qadisiyyah to the year 634-635,  





Fig. 2. The Topographical Map of the Battle of Yarmuk. © SYVÄNNE 2019 
                                                          
17 Ṭabarī 2091-2092; Theophanes AM 6126. Ṭabarī’s account is also confused because he later (2389ff.) 
jumps to the year 636-637 so that it is also possible that the Muslim invasion started in 635. 
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Fig. 3. Battle of Yarmuk. The Likely Battle Formations. © SYVÄNNE 2018 
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The only information that we have of the Roman combat formation is:  
the cavalry was posted in front; it was such that the Muslims had never before seen it; 
infantry was behind trenches which probably means the marching camp. The problem 
with this is that the Strategikon instructed the general not to involve many cavalry 
in infantry battles and in this case we are witnessing precisely this. The Strategikon has 
two alternative arrays in which the cavalry was posted in front: 1) Two cavalry lines 
posted in front with an infantry phalanx behind; 2) Three cavalry divisions posted 
in front as a single line with infantry phalanx two to three miles behind. The problem 
with these is that all of these were designed to be used against cavalry and not against 
the combined arms tactics employed by the Muslims, but this is precisely what 
happened now. The Romans posted their cavalry in advance of their infantry.  
The likeliest of these is the second version because that would explain better why 
Khalid was able to separate the Roman cavalry from the infantry
18
.  
We are on a more secure ground with the Muslim battle formation. According 
to Tabari, Khalid b. Walid arrayed the Muslim army in such a manner that they had 
never used before. Khalid arrayed the cavalry in front of the infantry phalanx so that 
these were divided into 36-40 or 38
19
 units called kardus (pl. karadis). In other words, 
these were deployed as 128 men strong rhomboids
20
. This formation was particularly 
useful for skirmishing style combat because the rhombus had fronts facing all 
directions while it also had four points which could be used to penetrate enemy 
formations. The right and left wings consisted both of 10 karadis so that each wing had 
ca. 1,280 horsemen in front of their infantry. The center consisted of 18 karadis for 
a total of 2,304 horsemen. The total number of cavalry would therefore have been 
4,864 plus the officers and supernumeraries. This would leave 41,136 footmen with 
the implication that the vast majority of the Muslim army consisted of infantry. 
However, in light of the previous and later descriptions of combat, I would suggest that 
a very significant portion of these footmen or rather that all of them would have been 
cavalry or camel mounted infantry that was just dismounted for this battle. Khalid 
placed Abu Ubaydah in command of the center, Amr in charge of the right wing with 
Shurahbil, and the left wing under Yazid
21
.  
Khalid began the battle by ordering the two wings of the center under Ikrimah 
and al-Qaqa forward. Each of them appears to have had six karadis so that the middle 
of the center had the remaining six karadis. This proves that each of the three cavalry 
divisions was further divided into left, center, and right just like in the Roman army. 
                                                          
18 Ṭabarī 2092ff.; Strategikon 12.1.1-6, 12.2.13, 12.2.23. 
19 Ṭabarī includes two variants. 
20 Blankinship (Ṭabarī, p.90 n.493) considers the karadis in this case to be an anachronism because Ṭabarī 
later (ii.1941, 1944) specifically states that Marwan b. Muhammad started their use in the eight century.  
I disagree. By this time the rhombus array had been used in this area for a period ca. 900 years and it is 
quite obvious that it was also familiar to the Arabs who had served in the Roman and Parthian-Sasanian 
armies which employed it.  
21 Ṭabarī 2092-2096. 
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The cavalry units attacked and then pursued each other, which means that the different 
cavalry units attacked and retreated as the situation dictated in a large scale skirmish. 
In the midst of this combat a rider arrived from Medina with the news that Abu Bakr 
had died and that Abu Ubaydah has been nominated as overall commander by Umar. 
Khalid placed the message in his quiver and kept the news to himself so that 
the soldiers would not become disordered. Abu Ubaydah, who was with Khalid, 
appears to have agreed with this decision. The placing of the message in quiver and 
the use of the rhombus array prove that the Muslim cavalry was using mounted 
archery, which is actually not surprising because the rhombus was the favorite unit 
order of the Armenian and Parthian mounted archers. The details given suggest that 
some of the Roman cavalry units left their formation to pursue the Muslim units who 
then performed an about turn at the same time as another Muslim unit charged against 
the pursuers after which the Romans retreated back to their lines so that one 
of the Roman units in reserve attacked against the Muslim units and the same thing 
was repeated again and again
22
.  
At that moment George from the Roman center approached to parley with 
Khalid. As a result of this meeting George deserted to the Muslim side and Khalid took 
him to his tent. We do not know the nationality of George, but it is possible that he was 
an Arab because an account based on Ibn Ishaq suggests that when the Muslims 
marched against the Romans the Lakhm and Judham deserted to their side.  
According to Ṭabarī, the Romans attacked when George deserted because they 
believed that George was attacking the enemy. The Romans forced the Muslims to 
leave their positions with the exception of Ikrimah and al-Harith b. Hisham
23
 who were 
in the center. This means that with the exception of the two commanders and units 
under them, the Muslim rhomboids were all forced to flee behind their infantry which 
is not surprising in light of the massive numerical superiority of the Roman cavalry. 
The Muslim infantry, however, naturally held its ground and forced the Roman cavalry 
back. This is not surprising because the Muslim infantry appears to have been 
deployed as a pike phalanx akin to the earlier Macedonian one but with the exception 
that it had a rank of men armed with short swords placed in the front
24
. This addition 
made the array also very suitable for close range combat. The presence of the Muslim 
rhomboids in the midst of the already weakened Roman cavalry center
25
 naturally 
disordered its array. Khalid and George then led their men forward against 
the disordered Roman cavalry while the other Muslim rhomboids regrouped behind 
the infantry and charged. The Romans were forced to retreat back to their positions
26
.  
                                                          
22 Ṭabarī 2092ff. ; Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian J1-2, 92-106. 
23 He is not mentioned among the commanders of rhomboids so he may be one of the missing karadis 
in the list which claims that there were up to 40 of those. 
24 SYVÄNNE 2004: 405-6. 
25 The desertion of George weakened it. 
26 Ṭabarī 2092-2099 (esp. 2099). 
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Khalid, however, did not stop his attack but ordered the Muslim cavalry 
to charge into the Roman cavalry formation which was in the midst of reforming after 
their retreat. The Muslims employed the swords at close quarters fighting with great 
effectiveness. According to Ṭabarī, Khalid and George kept on attacking the enemy. 
The combat lasted from before the sunrise (the above-mentioned beginning 
of the attack) until the sun was setting. The implication is that the Muslim rhomboids 
charged and retreated repeatedly and then performed the worship of Allah with a sign 
when this was possible during the maneuvering. This also implies that the Muslims 
changed their horses during this combat so that they were able to continue 
the relentless harassment. The Roman leadership was clearly incompetent because they 
could not prevent the Muslims from doing this despite their numerical advantage.  
It was then that George was killed. I would suggest that it was also then that the Lakhm 
and Judham fled to the neighboring villages thanks to the severity of fighting which is 
mentioned by Ibn Ishaq
27
.  
By the end of the day the repeated attacks against the Roman cavalry 
and the desertion of George with the Arabs had weakened the Roman center enough 
for it to collapse. Khalid charged through it so that he isolated the Roman cavalry 
from its infantry support. This caused a widespread panic so that the Roman cavalry 
simply fled. Some of them panicked completely so that it was every man for himself 
while other units appear to have fled under the leadership of their commanders. When 
the Muslims realized that the Roman cavalry was attempting to flee, they opened up 
their ranks to allow them to pass through. The Roman cavalry then scattered 
throughout the country and desert. This means that the Muslim cavalry units simply 
moved to allow the Romans room to flee while the Muslim infantry performed 
the highly sophisticated combat maneuver called antistomos difalangia which was 
meant to be used in such situations in which the enemy cavalry wedge charged 
at a phalanx. The idea was to allow the enemy cavalry or elephants or camels or 
chariots to pass through the formation in an orderly manner. This formation could also 
be used to subject those who passed through it to a bombardment of missiles, but 
in this case the Muslims apparently rather allowed the Romans just to go as fast as they 
could because Khalid and the Muslims aimed to destroy the Roman infantry
28
.  
After the Roman cavalry had abandoned their infantry to its own fate, Khalid 
and the Muslims advanced against the Roman infantry in its trench. The fact that 
the Roman infantry was protected by the trench actually bespeaks of its weak morale. 
Even if the morale of the infantry had been good at the beginning of the engagement,  
it was by now definitely low for two reasons. The distrust that the Roman leadership 
had showed towards the infantry had definitely lowered its morale, and the flight 
of the cavalry would have removed even the last shreds of their will to fight. Khalid 
                                                          
27 Ṭabarī 2092-2099 (esp. 2098-2099), 2348. 
28 Ṭabarī 2099; Byzantine Interpolation of Aelian Dain E1-5. 
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pushed the Roman infantry against al-Waqusah (probably Wadi Ruqqah) so that 
in the words of Ṭabarī the bound men and others fell into it so that those who were 
bound pulled even those who would have wanted to fight so that one pulled ten with 
him. Ṭabarī also states that 120,000 (80,000 bound and 40,000 unfettered) were 
plunged into al-Waqusah and killed besides those who had been killed in the battle 
between the cavalry and infantry. The bound men were undoubtedly the heavy-armed 
men using the tortoise formation while the unfettered were the lightly-armed.  
This should be interpreted so that the Romans lost 60,000 men of which 40,000 were 
infantry and 20,000 cavalry in addition to which there were the casualties suffered 
during the fighting and desertions. Vicarius (second-in-command hypostrategos),  
who had undoubtedly been in charge of the infantry, and the other Roman nobles 
resigned to their destiny and wrapped themselves in their mantles and sat down to be 
killed. Theodore fled to his brother Heraclius
29
. The Muslims lost 3,000 men including 
Ikrimah. After the battle had ended Abu Ubaydah assumed the command
30
. The loss 
of the Roman infantry sealed the fate of Roman Syria, Palestine and Arabia. Without 
infantry the Romans could not defeat the Muslims on the battlefield, and when 
the cities rather negotiated with the Muslims, it was impossible to defeat the Muslims 
with guerrilla warfare conducted by cavalry. The battle is a prime example of gross 
military incompetence. The Romans did not attempt to exploit their numerical 
advantage, but attacked head on as instructed by Heraclius. 
 
The Siege of Damascus and the Battle of Fihl (Pella) in August 634-February 635 
 
A significant portion of the surviving Roman cavalry appear to have fled 
southwards. It was because of this that Abu Ubaydah divided his forces into two 
divisions. He left Bashir b. Kab b. Ubayy al-Himyari with cavalry at Yarmuk to act as 
his rearguard, while he himself with most of the men pursued those who had fled 
northwards under Vahan. Ubaydah’s goal was to take Damascus. When the news 
of the Roman regrouping at Pella was brought to Abu Ubaydah, he halted at Marj 
al-Suffar and sent a message to Umar regarding the situation. Umar’s instructions were 
for Ubaydah to post shielding cavalry forces against the Romans at Pella, Palestine 
and Emesa while Ubaydah himself would attack Damascus
31
.  
Ubaydah dispatched ten commanders each with five subordinate commanders 
against the Romans at Pella. The Roman response was to resort to the opening up 
                                                          
29 One of the versions (Ṭabarī 2104) claim that he was killed, but it is clear that this confuses two 
Theodores. 
30 Ṭabarī 2099-2104, 2347ff. 
31 Ṭabarī 2144-2148. The battle of Fihl has usually been placed to take place after the so-called battle 
of Ajdanayn but this results from confusion of the two battles in the sources (different version in Ṭabarī 
2145-2148).  
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of the dams which created a muddy obstacle (presumably one of the rivers north 
of Pella) between the armies. The Muslim response was to contain the Roman threat 
from the opposite side of the river. Tabari claims that the size of the Roman force was 
80,000 horsemen, but one may divide this figure with at least two or… four. If it really 
consisted of 20,000-40,000 horsemen again, it was a very significant effort by 
the Romans who would have collected for this most of their available forces 
in southern Palestine, Arabia and Egypt. As instructed, Ubaydah also posted Dhu 
al-Kala between Damascus and Emesa to act as a covering force, and another force 
under Alqamah b. Hakim and Masruq between Damascus and Palestine. Damascus 
was protected by the forces of Nastas b. Nasturus. Ubaydah put the city under a hard 
siege which lasted for seventy days. The Muslims used assaults, archery fire,  
and ballistae, but to no avail because the defenders expected to be relieved. Indeed, 
Heraclius dispatched a relief army possibly under Vahan from Emesa, but the Muslim 
shielding force under Dhu al-Kala forced them to a halt in front of him. When 
the defenders then realized that the reinforcements would be unable to reach the city, 
their morale collapsed. It was then that a child was born to the patrikios Nastus. Nastus 
duly held a celebration possibly in an effort to uplift the morale. When Khalid’s scouts 
reported that the defenders were neglecting their posts, this was exploited by Khalid. 
Khalid and his men attacked the city at the strongest place because this was not 
expected. Khalid crossed the trench by using water-skins after which his men used rope 
ladders and lassoes to climb up to the wall. After this, they opened up the gate. 
Khalid’s men poured in, but at the other gates the citizens negotiated a deal with the 
other Muslim commanders. This agreement stipulated that the soldiers and others who 
wanted were allowed to leave while those who remained would pay the jizyah-tax. 
When the news of this reached Vahan, he retreated back to Heraclius. It was then that 
Umar commanded Ubaydah to dispatch 10,000 men to Iraq against the Persians
32
. 
Ubaydah and Umar both thought it was unwise to advance against Heraclius 
at Emesa while the rear was threatened by the concentration of Roman forces at Pella. 
Consequently, Ubaydah left Yazid with cavalry at Damascus and marched south. 
Yazid obtained the cities of Palmyra and Batanaea through surrender. Ubaydah 
dispatched Abu al-Awar to besiege the city of Tiberias. In the meanwhile Ubaydah 
advanced on the east side of the river Jordan to join forces with those who had already 
been sent against the Romans with the result that the Romans who were at Pella (Fihl) 
retreated across the river Jordan and then opened up the dams close to the city 
Skythopolis (Baysan) so that the river became a muddy obstacle between the two 
armies. Ubaydah encamped his army at Pella and sent a letter to Umar to ask 
for further instructions. However, before this happened, the Romans under their 
commander Saqallar b. Mikhraq (probably Theodore the sakellarios) attempted 
a surprise attack and crossed the river. The Muslims were prepared and in combat 
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formation. The result was the hardest fought battle of the war which lasted until 
the Romans were disordered during the darkness of the second night
33
. The sakellarios 
and the second-in-command Nasturus were both killed with the result that the Romans 
fled. The Muslims gave chase but were initially unable to find them because they did 
not realize that the Romans would ride straight into the mud of the River Jordan. Once 
the Muslims realized where the Romans were, they butchered them. With the exception 





Fig. 4. Roman Damascus. © SYVÄNNE 2018 
                                                          
33 The Muslims used the khat to enable them to withstand prolonged combat and were therefore able 
to outlast the Romans. See SYVÄNNE 2014. 
34 Ṭabarī 2150-2159, 2227-8, 2305, 2347, 2349-2350. 
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Fig. 5. Battle of Pihl/Pella. © SYVÄNNE 2018 
 
 




Shurahbil and Amr were left behind to continue the conquest of Jordan, 
Palestine and Arabia, while Abu Ubaydah and Khalid b. Walid marched north against 
Heraclius in the city of Emesa. Ubaydah’s idea was to surprise the Romans 
by continuing the operations in the middle of winter. En route they were joined by 
the cavalry forces of Bashir b. Kabb b. Ubayy al-Himyari who had been left at 
                                                          
35 This chapter is based on Ṭabarī 2158-2159 and 2389ff. 
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Yarmuk
36
. When the news of the enemy advance was brought to Heraclius, he sent 
Theodore the patrikios against them. According to Ṭabarī, Theodore pitched 
a marching camp on the plain to the west of the city of Damascus – in truth south-west 
of Damascus. Shanas al-Rumi served as his second-in-command (hypostrategos).  
The Roman army consisted of cavalry, which on the basis of the text and composition 
of the force means that its purpose was to force a battle with the advancing Muslim 
army.  
On the basis of this it is clear that the Romans were forced to rely solely 
on their cavalry against the combined forces of their Muslim enemy. This brings up 
the question why did Heraclius rely solely on his cavalry? Does this mean that he no 
longer had any combat ready infantry left and that he had to use whatever poor quality 
infantry he had for the defense of the cities and forts? Or, does this mean that Heraclius 
did not know how to use infantry or lacked confidence in its fighting ability?  
If Heraclius had adequate numbers of combat ready infantry left to engage 
the Muslims, his decision to rely solely on cavalry was an inexcusable military 
blunder. However, on the basis of the numbers of infantry lost at the battle of Yarmuk, 
it is quite probable that Heraclianus had lost so many footmen that he no longer had 
any meaningful numbers of combat ready infantry left. This would mean that the defeat 
at Yarmuk had already decided the outcome of the war for the next few years.  
Abu Ubaydah attacked first the Roman cavalry who were under Shanas 
al-Rumi at Marj al-Rum. Ṭabarī states that the Romans were suffering from the effects 
of winter so that many of them were wounded. Shanas had the same number 
of horsemen as Theodore and his mission was to act as second-in-command 
for Theodore. In the context of period tactics, Shanas was therefore the hypostrategos 
whose place in the cavalry array was in the middle of the front line. This means that 
Shanas had been deployed in the front while Theodore was behind, but probably 
in such a manner that the two commanders guarded two different roads.  
When Theodore failed to appear on the scene Shanas built a separate marching 
camp presumably close to the place of combat. My guess is that it was behind the river 
shown on the map. The facts that the Romans suffered many wounded during this first 
attack and Shanas built a separate camp mean three things: Firstly, Shanas had been 
defeated and presumably forced to retreat; Secondly, the Muslims had a combined 
force while Shanas had only cavalry, which made it next to impossible for the Romans 
to defeat the Muslims; Thirdly, Theodore failed to bring support to Shanas. In short, 
these two Roman commanders failed to cooperate and coordinate their actions in any 
meaningful manner. This alone would have sealed the fate of this Roman expedition. 
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Fig. 6. Battle of Marj al-Rum. © SYVÄNNE 2018 
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On top of this Theodore deserted Shanas in the middle of the night 
and marched towards Damascus. The reason for this appears to have been the fact that 
the Muslims turned their line, because Tabari states that Khalid was opposite Theodore 
while Abu Ubaydah was opposite Shanas. This could have happened only if Khalid 
had bypassed Shanas on the left and threatened Theodore from the flank with the result 
that Theodore fled north-east towards Damascus. The Muslims were therefore 
conducting a simultaneous night attack against both Roman camps, the move of which 
was detected but only with the result that the Roman disaster became even greater.  
The Roman commanders had clearly blundered by not joining their forces in the same 
camp – it is impossible to know what were the instructions given by Theodore 
to Shanas before the battle, but what is clear is that Shanas did not retreat 
to Theodore’s camp and neither did Theodore join Shanas. Regardless of what 
the orders were, the main culprit for the defeat was obviously still the overall 
commander Theodore who should not have abandoned his second-in-command.  
The Muslim commanders agreed that Khalid would pursue Theodore with light cavalry 
while Abu Ubaydah attacked Shanas who was killed
37
. The Muslims had informed 
Yazid b. Abi Sufvan who had been left at Damascus with cavalry
38
 that Theodore 
would be fleeing towards him with the result that he arrayed his forces to blockade 
Theodore’s route. Khalid reached the scene just when the two sides were fighting 
against each other with the result that the Romans were utterly crushed and Theodore 
killed. When Abu Ubaydah had also defeated his enemy, the Muslim victory was 
complete. Thanks to the fact that the Romans consisted of cavalry some of them were 
able to flee to Emesa. Abu Ubaydah pursued them up to there and Khalid b. Walid 
joined him soon there, and the city was placed under a siege.  
Heraclius, however, had already fled and crossed the Euphrates into 
Mesopotamia so that he had a river between himself and the enemy. He stayed 
at al-Ruha so that he sometimes made threatening movements by moving out 
of the city in an effort to keep the enemy guessing where he intended to go. He also 
dispatched the dux of Emesa to take charge of the defense of the city. His orders were 
not to fight except during the cold days because it was winter and the Muslims would 
suffer because of this. The commander acted as instructed but the Muslims were not 
deterred despite the sufferings. The faith kept the men warm. Then when the spring 
came, there appears to have been an earthquake which caused the defenders 
to negotiate a surrender on the same terms as at Damascus. Consequently, the Muslims 
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Heraclius’ measures to halt the Muslim advance had so far proved a failure 
and this trend continued. Abu Ubaydah dispatched Khalid b. Walid against the city 
of Qinnasrin which was located south of Aleppo. When Khalid had reached 
the populated area close to the city, the Romans under their commander Minas/Menas 
attacked him to save the city. According to Ṭabarī, this Minas was the greatest man 
after Heraclius, which probably means that he was the magister officiorum. It is clear 
that Heraclius must have dispatched him with the elite court troops to save the place. 
After all, even though the text does not state how many men Abu Ubaydah gave 
Khalid b. Walid, it is clear that his contingent cannot have been larger than 
about 7,000-10,000 men so that it could have seemed possible to attempt the relief 
with the small elite forces under the magister. The two fought a battle in the populated 
area with the result that Minas and all his men died. This probably means that Khalid 
had placed his men in an ambush inside the houses of the populated area. This would 
have negated the effects of the charge of the Roman elite cavalry on top of which these 
would have found themselves scattered among the houses and fields with no way out 
of the trap. This was first rate generalship. After this the people of this area sent 
a message to Khalid in which they stated that they were Arabs and that the enemy had 
forced them to serve against the Muslims and that they did not want to do this. Khalid 
accepted the excuse and continued his march against Qinnasrin. The people 
of Qinnasrin, however, fortified themselves against Khalid and asked for terms 
of surrender. Khalid agreed, but only with the condition that the city was destroyed, 
presumably meaning the walls, and so it happened. The city of Emesa suffered 
a similar fate.  
In the meanwhile, Heraclius had learnt of what had happened to Minas.  
He decided to retreat to Arsanas (Shimhat), and when the Muslims reached al-Ruha,  
he fled to Constantinople. He had no other alternative. The Muslims attacked with two 
divisions. Khalid attacked from Syria while the Arabs of Mesopotamia attacked from 
the direction of Mosul (ancient Niniveh) along the corridor between the Euphrates 
and Tigris. Had Heraclius stayed in place, his route of retreat would have been cut off 
by Khalid’s division. At the same time as this happened, Heraclius evacuated all 
the fortresses between Alexandretta and Tarsus, and had all the fortresses in the area 
destroyed, while his men conducted a guerrilla campaign against the invaders by laying 
out ambushes near the fortresses – a tactic which was later codified in the 10th century 
de Velitatione. In short, it was Heraclius who introduced the standard East Roman 
defensive strategy and which consisted of the holding of the passes of the Taurus range 
                                                          
40 Ṭabarī 2390-2391, 2393ff. 
 Page | 56  





The Battle of Ajdanayn and the Muslim Conquest of Jerusalem in 635 
 
In the meanwhile, the Romans had assembled their remaining forces 
in the south at the cities of Skythopolis, Ajdanayn and Gaza. Two these cities, 
Skythopolis and Tiberias, surrendered on the same terms as Damascus, which meant 
that the Roman forces and all of those who wished departed with them. This gave 
the Muslims the possession of half of each city and its taxes. The terms of surrender 
enabled the Romans to evacuate their forces to the cities of Caesarea and Gaza. Gaza 
was held by al-Fiqar (vicarius), Caesarea by someone unknown, and Ajdanayn 
by al-Artabun (Artabanus). Umar ordered Amr to attack Artabanus, Alqamah 
b. Mujazziz to fight against vicarius and Yazid to send Muawiyah against Caesarea. 
Muawiyah defeated his enemy in battle and stormed and conquered his city. Alqmah 
b. Hakim al-Firasi and Masruq b. al-Akki were sent to isolate the defenders 
of Jerusalem so that these would be unable to bring help to the other cities. In addition 
to this Umar dispatched a relay of reinforcements to Amr
42
. Artabanus foiled 
the Muslim attempts for a long time simply by refusing to come out of his fortifications 
and trenches at Ajdanayn. He had also placed garrisons in the cities of Jerusalem 
and al-Ramlah. Amr, however, resorted to a stratagem. He acted as if he would be 
an envoy from Amr and entered the Roman fortifications to negotiate. When Amr had 
learnt what its weaknesses were, he returned back and attacked. Artabanus was 
defeated. The Muslim forces that were posted to guard Jerusalem gave way 
and allowed Artabanus to reach the city. These Muslims then joined Amr at Ajdanayn. 
Amr and Ubaydah wrote to Umar and asked his personal help on how to deal with 
the situation. Umar in his turn ordered the commanders to meet him at al-Jabiyah
43
.  
When the news of the arrival of Umar was brought to Artabanus, he 
and al-Tadhariq fled to Egypt and abandoned the cities of Jerusalem and al-Ramlah 
to their own devices – both were subsequently killed during one of the summer raids. 
The populace decided to strike a deal with the Muslims. They realized that help would 
not be forthcoming anytime soon. Sophronios, the Bishop of Jerusalem, took the lead 
and asked for terms of surrender in return for religious freedom and the exclusion 
of Jews from the city of Jerusalem. Umar was a pragmatist and accepted this in return 
for the jizyah-tax payments by the Christian population. After this Umar entered 
the city of Jerusalem and started the building of the Dome of the Rock on the holiest 
of Jewish sites, the Temple Mount. 
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The Muslim conquest of Jerusalem was a military conquest. The Muslim claim 
to the city is entirely based on their original military conquest of the city in about 
635-636. Had this attempt failed, there would not be any claim.  
The principal reasons for the ability of the Muslims to capture Jerusalem were: 
1) The Muslim use of the combined arms concept; 2) The inability of the Roman 
commanders to cooperate effectively and form any effective strategy to foil the Muslim 
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advantages. In other words, the Romans committed the same mistake as the Persians 
when they fought against the Muslims
44
. This was a grave and militarily unforgivable 
mistake. The Roman reliance on cavalry worked quite well against the Sasanians,  
who also relied on cavalry to win their battles, but not against an enemy which 
employed the same combined arms concept as Alexander the Great had used.  
The Roman leadership also made the situation worse by choosing such battlefields that 
made retreat next to impossible. In contrast, the Muslim forces were always well 
drilled and under capable leaders. On top of this, unlike the Romans, the Muslims were 
at all times highly motivated to fight thanks to the religious indoctrination and string 
of successes they had enjoyed.  
The account preserved by Ṭabarī – mainly after Sayf – has preserved for us 
the likeliest version of what happened during the initial stages of Muslim conquest.  
It is not only the most detailed of the accounts, but it is also the best match with 
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